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Introduction 
 
The worldwide trend towards ageing of societies is well documented with extensive 
discussions of support and care needs for frail older people. There is less discussion of the 
implications of gender differences in later life for access to support in the event of frailty or 
disability. Although, marital status is fundamental to well-being in later life (Arber and 
Ginn, 1991, 1995; Gaymu et al., 2008), there has been less appreciation of the scale of 
gender difference in marital status in later life, variations between societies, and their 
implications. It is important to consider the interaction between gender and marital status 
and the ways this may change over time (Arber, 2004a; Arber, 2004b; Manning and Brown, 
2011). The focus of this chapter is to examine the intersection of gender and marital status in 
later life across societies, how this links to inter-generational relations, and how global 
changes make it increasingly important to consider the implications of the gender and 
marital status interaction when studying access to caregivers and social support in later life. 
 
Globalisaton and changes influencing inter-generational relations 
 
Recent and rapidly accelerating societal changes associated with globalisation and changing 
cultural norms are having a profound impact on inter-generational relations and the nature of 
flows between generations. Four changes are outlined. First, the global labour market results 
in international migration of young and midlife adults to work in other countries, e.g. from 
the Philippines to work as maids in Singapore or nurses in the UK, from Poland and central 
European countries to work across the full spectrum of jobs in the UK, and from India and 
Pakistan to work in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states (Isaksen et al., 2008).  At the same time, 
the rapid industrialisation of many emerging economies, such as China, India, and Mexico 
has witnessed vast migratory flows from rural to urban areas, with the older generation (and 
often also their children) left behind in rural settings.  For example, there were 147 million 
Chinese rural-to-urban migration in 2005 (National Statistics Bureaus of China 2006, cited 
in Guo et al., 2009).  
 
A second major change is the increased role that women now play in the paid labour force 
throughout the world. The expectation in northern European countries is that women with 
children will work full-time, following periods of maternity leave (Saraceno, 2008).  
Traditional family structures with women as full-time housewives and homemakers have 
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sharply declined. Implications of this change relate to who provides care for children (during 
mothers’ paid work), and who cares for frail or disabled older people, should they need care 
and support. A key debate in Europe is whether such care should be provided by the state 
through welfare services or by the family, particularly whether state provision ‘crowds out’ 
or ‘substitutes for’ care by the family, or whether state provision ‘complements’ family care 
provision (Kunemund, 2008; Keck, 2008). 
 
A third change, which itself has been influenced by the previous two, is the decline in 
extended family co-residence, e.g. in three-generational households. The corollary of the 
growth of nuclear family residential patterns is that more older people live separately from 
younger relatives, either living together in couple-only households or living alone as a single 
person. In a traditional, rural region of China, Silverstein and colleagues (2006) found that 
only 23% of parents lived in three-generation families.  
 
A final change, inter-connected with the other societal changes, relates to the decline in the 
birthrate and size of the family.  Many countries have a birthrate that has been below 
replacement level for over two decades, e.g. Italy and Germany. China has had a ‘one child’ 
policy for over 30 years, and increasingly a child from a one child family marries another 
‘only’ child, with the result that the couple have potentially four parents (or parents-in-law) 
to support should they become frail or disabled.  In nearly all countries, the birthrate has 
tumbled, representing a sea change, as fewer children will be available to provide care or 
support to the growing older population. At the same time, there has been a substantial 
increase in childlessness, for example, in the UK, it is estimated that 30% of women who are 
currently 35 will remain childless. A key issue is who will provide care for the childless 
when they reach later life.   
 
The demographic changes of declining fertility and decreased mortality have resulted in 
more vertically extended families of 3 or 4 generations, sometimes characterised as ‘bean-
pole’ families. Hagestad (2006) discusses that ‘top heavy’ families are becoming 
increasingly common, with more grandparents than grandchildren, whereas in the past 
family structures were pyramidal, with a larger number of grandchildren and children, and  
smaller number of grandparents (Arber and Timonen, 2012). In addition, there are more 
‘truncated’ families with no generations below them (Hagestad and Herlofson, 2005). 
Societies vary in the extent to which family structures are ‘top heavy’, ‘bean pole’ or 
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‘pyramidal’ in structure, as well as the prevalence of ‘truncated’ families.  The shape of 
generational structures have implications for intergenerational relations, flows of resources 
between generations, and particularly for older women. 
  
Inter-generational flows (or transfers) 
 
The so-called crisis of care for older people needs to be set within the wider context of inter-
generational relations, which can be conceptualised as sets of upward and downward flows 
between the generations. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the nature of 
different types of intergenerational support between family members, which for illustrative 
purposes comprises 4 generations. The nature and extent of these flows are in rapid flux 
because of the sets of factors outlined in the previous section – migration, increases in 
women’s labour force participation, decline in multi-generational households, and increase 
in one child families and childless adults.    
……………………… 
Figure 1 about here 
……………………… 
There are four main types of intergenerational flows, namely: (1) Financial and material 
flows,  (2) Co-residence,  (3) Care or support for children, and (4) Care or support for frail, 
older people.  The first two flows may occur in either direction, as upwards or downwards 
flows, while the final two are largely unidirectional. The prevalence of each of these inter-
generational flows and their directionality are all inter-connected. The nature, volume and 
direction of these flows differs markedly between societies, particularly in concert with the 
nature of welfare state provision across societies (Saraceno, 2008), as well as according to 
the factors outlined above.  Each of these types of flows will be briefly considered:  
 
Financial and material flows 
Extensive research in Europe and north America has demonstrated that there are much 
greater downward financial flows from the grandparent (or great-grandparent) generation to 
the parent and grandchild generation  (Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2000a, 2000b; Albertini et 
al. 2007).   These downward inter-vivos flows may occur over lengthy periods, for example, 
providing financial assistance with education of the grandchild generation, buying an adult 
child’s first house, and gifts, as well as major financial flows through inheritance. Such 
 5 
downward financial flows serve to increase inequality between social groups in society, 
while equalising financial resources between generations (Hagestad and Herlofson, 2005). 
 
One key success of many welfare states and pension systems has been to enable older people 
to be financially independent of their adult children and to reside separately.  Even in 
countries with low state pensions, such as the UK, although many older people may be 
technically defined as ‘in poverty’, their poverty level is rarely so great that they require 
financial support from family members in order to subsist. This contrasts with many 
emerging countries, with only rudimentary pension systems, where most older people live 
from their own resources, such as from paid employment, subsistence agriculture, or their 
own savings (if any).  Where they have few personal financial or pension resources and are 
unable to work or earn money by any other means, older people are usually dependent on 
household or other family members, mainly their adult children (if they have any).  For 
example, in China, and countries with extensive rural-urban or transnational migration, adult 
children working in urban areas or other countries, may send substantial remittances back to 
the grandparent generation living in rural areas (Silverstein et al., 2006; Baker and 
Silverstein, 2012).  Thus, upward flows of financial resources from the parent to the 
grandparent (or great grandparent) generation occur mainly in countries that have limited 
pension systems or welfare support for older people. 
 
Co-residence  
Inter-generational relations and transfers tend to occur in a ‘natural’ (non-obvious and 
unacknowledged) way when more than one generation co-reside in the same household. In 
situations of co-residence, where there is shared accommodation and generally shared meals, 
there is little concept of financial or material transfers between generations of family 
members living in the same household.  However, once the household fissures and 
generations live separately, each separate unit must finance their separate housing, living 
costs and food.  It is well-known that multi-generational or extended family living is less 
costly than living in separate households. Increasingly in many European countries, adult 
children are co-residing for longer in the parental home, representing a substantial 
downwards flow of financial, material and emotional support. 
 
Living in a multi-generational family, generally occludes the possibility of assessing the 
value of material or financial transfers in both directions associated with co-residence. The 
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care by parents for their children goes unremarked, not generally being seen as a transfer 
between generations. However, when the adult generation is missing because of working in 
an urban area or another country, this puts into sharp relief, normative care by parents 
(primarily mothers) for their children. Where a grandparent co-resides in the same 
household as the parent generation and/or the grandchild generation, there are likely to be 
multiple flows in both directions on an everyday basis. The frequency and complex 
interweaving of these flows of household labour, practical care, and emotional and social 
support mean they are largely invisible, and their importance only becomes apparent if one 
or more family members move to live in separate households, when these flows can be more 
easily recognised, ‘named’ and measured, as ‘financial support’, ‘practical help’, ‘care’ or 
simply ‘visiting’.   
 
Care for Children 
It is obvious that young children need care on a 24 hour basis, with the nature of care for 
children changing as they grow older, from physical and practical (instrumental) care, to 
developmental care and emotional support. Where the parent generation or (in practice) the 
mother is absent completely, then grandparents (largely grandmothers) often take over the 
parental role.  This occurs where the adult child dies (e.g. from AIDs in Africa) or is unable 
to perform the ‘normative’ mothering role (e.g. because of drug addiction in the US), in such 
cases the grandparents may take over the full role of the parents, co-residing with their 
grandchildren. Such (custodial) grandparents have been termed ‘child savers’ (Arber and 
Timonen, 2012).  In cases, of rural-urban migration or transnational migration of the parent 
generation, children are often ‘left behind’ in (or sent back to) the rural areas to live with 
their grandparents or other relatives. In China, the proportion of these ‘skipped generation’ 
families, comprising grandparents and grandchildren without the middle generation present, 
has increased rapidly in rural areas (Silverstein et al., 2006). Grandparents in these 
households are performing the parental role, and play a pivotal role in enabling their own 
adult children to work and earn money in urban areas, through care for their grandchildren 
on a full-time basis (Baker and Silverstein, 2012).  
 
Where women work full-time in societies with limited access to state provided childcare or 
daycare, where childcare is expensive, or women command low or modest wages, the main 
option for women who wish to (or financially need to) work is for children to be cared for 
on a daily basis by one or both sets of grandparents.  These grandparents could be seen as 
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‘mother savers’, since they enable the better financial wellbeing of the parent generation, as 
well as the well-being and development of grandchildren, but represents a substantial time, 
practical and emotional commitment by the grandparents (Arber and Timonen, 2012).  
Herlofson and Hagestad (2012) show that in the Nordic countries, despite grandparents not 
being involved in day to day childcare provision, they are generally the first ‘port of call’ in 
a ‘crisis’ or an emergency, when back-up childcare is needed, such as when a child is 
unwell, and are characterised as ‘family savers’.   
 
Care of children and grandchildren by definition represents a ‘downward’ inter-generational 
flow of caring resources. Although, flows from grandparents are often seen as gender-less, 
they are primarily transfers from older women to the parent generation, since the bulk of 
care for grandchildren is provided by grandmothers or other female relatives. 
 
Care for frail or older relatives  
Should an older person become frail, disabled or mentally confused, they are likely to 
require support on a regular or daily basis to remain living in the community.  The first port 
of call for such personal care and practical (instrumental) support is generally other 
household members. Where an older person is married, this support is likely to be provided 
by their spouse, unless the older couple co-reside in an extended multi-generational family, 
in which case the main carer for older women may be the daughter (or daughter-in-law). In 
the UK, when an older married person requires care, this is almost always provided by their 
spouse, irrespective of gender (Arber and Ginn, 1991, 1992; Rose and Bruce, 1995).   
However, in many patriarchal societies and those with more rigid gender divisions, there 
may be a weak or non-existent cultural norm for husbands to provide care for their wives.  
  
In the UK, Europe and north America, only a tiny minority of older people co-reside with 
adult children. Following widowhood, most older people live alone, rather than live with 
their adult children, friends or other relatives. Older women and men who live alone 
therefore need to rely on support from either welfare state services, privately paid carers, or 
from family members or friends who live elsewhere.  European states vary markedly in the 
extent of welfare state provision for older people demonstrating a clear North-South divide  
(Hagestad, 2006). But even in the Nordic countries, with high welfare state provision, family 
members complement state support and provide extensive care for frail elderly parents. Most 
research indicates that the bulk of care for frail older people living alone is provided by 
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daughters providing ‘care at a distance’. Thus, by definition ‘informal care’ for frail older 
people is either provided by the same generation between spouses (or sometimes siblings or 
friends), or is an upward flow from the middle (or grandchild) generation.  
 
Care giving may be particularly problematic for ‘truncated generations’, where an older 
person has no children. As well as the rapid increase in childlessness and one child families, 
children may predecease their parents, including from AIDs (especially in Africa). Thus, a 
higher proportion of the middle generation in the future will reach late old age without 
children. They will have to rely on others, rather than children, to provide practical care and 
support when needed, which may be particularly problematic if they are widowed/divorced, 
and without a partner to provide such care.  Childless people who become frail or disabled 
will therefore have to rely on the state for care, friends or more distant relatives, such as 
nieces or siblings. However, welfare state retrenchment means that the state’s role in 
supporting older people is likely to diminish in the future (Estes and Wallace, 2010).    
 
Weighing up net levels of transfers of resources between generations 
Extensive literature has assessed whether flows downwards from the grandparent generation 
to the parent (or grandchild) generation outweigh flows upwards from the middle to the 
grandparent generation (Attias-Donfut and Woolf, 2000a, 2000b; Kohli et al., 2000), 
concluding that in European countries, there are much greater financial flows downwards 
than upwards.  However, the valuation of financial flows are in principle easier to estimate 
than calculating the value of practical and caregiving support.   
 
Despite these difficulties, the rhetoric about the rapid increase of the ageing population and 
the ‘consequent burden’ of paying for and/or caring for the frail older population focuses 
primarily on the ‘unsustainable’ nature of the required upwards flows. It rarely considers the 
downward flows in terms of financial and caring contributions of older people to the middle 
and grandchild generations. Almost entirely neglected are valuations of the much more 
widespread general contributions to society of older people in terms of their role in 
community support, voluntary work, etc.  
  
Societal changes, such as the growth of migration both transnationally and between rural-
urban areas, mean that the nature of intergenerational transfers may change. Although, 
financial remittances can be transferred from the middle generation to the older generation 
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living ‘back home’ (Silverstein et al. 2006; Baker and Silverstein, 2012), it is generally 
much harder (or impossible) to provide everyday practical or personal care to a frail or 
disabled parent from hundreds of miles away. Thus, long distance migration potentially 
leaves a ‘care gap’ for the older generation who are ‘left behind’ in rural areas or in the 
‘home country’.  The implications of these societal changes and changes in the nature of 
intergenerational relationships are likely to have greater adverse effects for older women’s 
well-being in later life. 
 
 
The feminisation of later life cross-nationally 
 
Because of the popular and policy focus on the ‘burden’ of older people and to what extent 
inter-generational relations can sustain/accommodate this growing ‘burden’ – the remainder 
of the chapter focuses on gender and care for older people. It addresses the gender and 
marital status of older people who are likely to ‘need’ such ‘burdensome’ care by society (in 
an era of welfare state retrenchment) or from family members or others.  
 
Policy-related literature on ageing often conceptualises older people who ‘need’ care in an 
undifferentiated way, as ‘the elderly’ or ‘the old’, and as genderless (Bould and Casaca, 
2011). This is despite extensive research by feminist scholars and others that has challenged 
earlier views of older people as homogenous, and documented inter-sectional differences 
associated with gender, class, race, ethnicity and sexuality (Arber and Ginn 1991, 1995; 
Calasanti and Slevin 2001, 2006; Mutchler and Burr, 2011). In contrast, policy makers and 
analysts have primarily been concerned about the ‘social problems’ of an ageing population. 
The vast majority of older people who ‘need care’ and thus will represent a ‘burden’ on 
other relatives or the state are older women, and these women are primarily widowed. This 
section focuses on the numerical predominance of older women, and the next section 
examines the likelihood of being a widow, while most older men can expect to die married. 
The reasons underlying the much larger number of women than men who need care in later 
life are first outlined. 
……………………… 
Table 1 about here 
……………………… 
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Gender differences in expectation of life 
 
In nearly all countries women outlive men. The gender differential in expectation of life at 
birth ranges from women living 12-13 years longer than men in Russia and some Eastern 
European countries to roughly equal life expectancy in Pakistan, India and Egypt (UN, 
2008), see Table 1.  The high or ‘conventional’ gender difference in expectation of life, 
found in most European and other developed countries, is women living 5-7 years longer 
than men. However, there is considerable variation, for example from a difference in life 
expectancy of 7 years in France and Finland, reducing to 4.8 years in the UK. Some 
countries are experiencing a decreasing feminisation of later life, because of faster 
improvements in male than female mortality, as in the UK over the last 30 years (Arber and 
Ginn, 2005).  
 
Some emerging countries, such as Brazil show a wide gender difference of 7.7 years in 
expectation of life.  Whereas other emerging countries, such as China and Singapore, show a 
‘modest’ gender difference of 3-4 years.  It seems likely that these gender differences will 
become greater over time, and that more emerging countries in the future will have a gender 
difference in life expectancy similar to that of the ‘high’ difference countries of Europe.  
 
Gender differences in mortality vary between societies for a range of reasons, including 
variation between men and women’s roles in paid employment (including the danger, 
occupational hazards and stresses associated with employment roles); men and women’s 
lifestyles and risk behaviours (men having more ‘risky’ lifestyles linked to smoking, alcohol 
consumption, motor accidents), and the cultural roles and valuation of women versus men 
(Arber and Thomas, 2001). The extent that changes in gender equality will lead to women 
taking on comparable roles to men in the workplace and similar levels of ‘risky’ behaviours, 
will tend to reduce gender differences in expectation of life in the future.  
 
Therefore countries with near gender equality in mortality (and expectation of life), such as 
Pakistan, are likely to be where women’s social status is low, and women are more likely to 
have poor nutrition, less access to health care, are subject to frequent births, and have high 
maternal mortality (Santow 1995, Doyal 1995, Fuse and Crenshaw, 2006).  The gender 
difference in life expectancy is likely to be lower in societies where there is greater valuation 
of boy children and men, than girl children and women. As maternal mortality decreases in 
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societies, and there is greater equality in the cultural valuation of the two sexes, this will 
tend to increase gender differences in expectation of life. 
 
In some countries the life expectancy for women above 65 is the same or lower than that of 
men, such as in Egypt (Table 1).  It is therefore important to consider what societal or 
cultural factors may disadvantage older women’s survival in some societies, compared to the 
more ‘conventional’ pattern of women having a 3-5 year greater life expectancy at 65 than 
men. Improved health care and economic development in many emerging nations is likely to 
go hand-in-hand with a growing numerical predominance of older women among the ageing 
population. Thus, more emerging countries in the future are likely to have a sex ratio in 
mortality similar to that of the ‘high difference’ countries of Europe.  
 
Sex Ratios in Later Life  
 
Gender differences in life expectancy are the main factor influencing sex ratios in later life. 
In nearly all societies, the proportion of women to men increases with advancing age. The 
greater the numerical predominance of older women at higher ages, the greater the relative 
proportion of older women than men that are likely to be frail or disabled and require care 
and support.  
 
……………………… 
Figure 2 about here 
……………………… 
 
Figure 2 shows the degree of feminisation of later life in a range of countries. In most 
European and western countries, there are 30-50% more women than men above age 65;   
this female ‘excess’ increases with advancing age. Figure 2(a) shows that for the UK, France 
and the US, there are over twice as many women aged 85-89 as men, which increases to 
three times as many aged 90-94, and over four times as many over age 95 in the UK and 
France.  However, in countries with ‘abnormally’ high gender differences in life expectancy, 
the female predominance of older women over men is more stark. Figure 2(b) contrasts sex 
ratios in later life in Russia and Estonia compared with the UK, showing more than twice as 
many women as men in their late 70s in Russia and Estonia (compared to 41% more in UK), 
and four times as many women as men aged 85-89 (2.3 times more in the UK). Thus, in 
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Russia and Eastern European countries, the vast majority of older people who require 
financial and caring support are women.  
 
A different picture of how sex ratios change with ageing emerges in countries with a low 
gender difference in life expectancy. Figure 2(c) contrasts Pakistan and India with Cuba 
(which has a modest gender difference in life expectancy). India shows no evidence of more 
older women in each age group over 65, unlike in virtually all other countries. And in 
Pakistan there are more men than women in all ages above 60; falling to reach a sex ratio of 
74 women for every 100 men in their early 80s. The lack of feminisation of later life in 
India, Pakistan and other countries with a negligible or low gender difference in life 
expectancy at age 65, is likely to reflect differential cultural valuations of older women and 
men, which may be manifest in a particularly precarious existence for older widows in these 
societies.  
 
In conclusion, a greater feminisation of later life in terms of more older women than men 
with advancing age, means the vast majority of older people who require care and support in 
later life will be women. In addition, future societal changes may result in emerging 
countries having a greater predominance of women with advancing age than is evident at 
present.  
 
Older women, widowhood and the provision of care  
 
Marital status is pivotal to the living arrangements, financial well-being, care-giving support 
and social relationships of older people, but in divergent ways for older women and men. It 
is therefore important to examine how gender differences in marital status change with age. 
Widowhood is a significant transition, often representing the loss of a partner of 40-50 
years, who may have been their main source of companionship, support and care. 
 
Gender differences in life expectancy and the increasingly divergent sex ratio with 
advancing age suggests a high proportion of older women will be living as widows.  
However, the proportion of widows in a society cannot be directly ‘read off’ gender 
differences in life expectancy and changing sex ratios with advancing age.  The relative 
number of older people who are married versus widowed also depends on gender differences 
in age of marriage. In most European and western societies, men are on average 2-3 years 
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older than women at first marriage. For example, in France, if the gender gap in life 
expectancy of 7 years is added to a (first) marriage age gap of 2-3 years, then a French 
woman can expect to live as a widow on average for 9-10 years. However, the marriage age 
gap is much larger in many emerging countries, as well as for remarriages.    
 
Gender differences in marital status in later life 
 
Across all societies, the vast majority of older men are married, and therefore have a partner 
for domestic service support, companionship and for care should they become physically 
disabled, whereas this is the case for only a minority of older women.  Figure 3 shows four 
contrasting societies, Canada, Japan, Singapore and Turkey; in each case over three-quarters 
of men over 65 are married (varying from 75% in Canada to 88% in Turkey).  Even above 
age 80, two-thirds of men are married in each country. This contrasts with women over 65, 
where in each society under half of women are married (40-48%), and the likelihood of 
being married declines steeply with advancing age. Over age 80, only a small proportion of 
women are married, varying from 15% in Japan to 22% in Turkey.   
……………………. 
Figure 3 about here 
…………………………… 
 
In later life, being married is normative for older men and widowhood is normative for older 
women. More women over 65 are widowed than are married in each of these countries, and 
above age 80, over 80% are widowed. Despite the cultural and economic differences 
between these four societies, there is a remarkable consistency in the proportions of older 
men who are married and of women who are widowed.  In contrast, more older people are 
divorced or never married in Canada, 13% (and in Europe and other western societies) than 
in Turkey, 0.8% (and in Asian or Middle Eastern societies), see Table 2(a). This has 
implications for intergenerational relationships and the need for care, since divorced and 
never married older people (particularly men) may have limited family support networks to 
provide care should they become frail or disabled (Arber and Ginn, 1991; Arber, 2004a, 
2004b).  
……………………… 
Table 2 about here 
……………………… 
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Another way to highlight the fact that most older men are married, whereas older women are 
widowed, is to examine sex ratios among the married and among the widowed. For the five 
societies in Table 2(b), the preponderance of women over 65 compared with men is shown 
by the sex ratio, which varies from 1.22 in Singapore to 1.46 in France (146 women for 
every 100 men). But this modest numerical predominance of older women (shown by the 
sex ratio) hides very different sex ratios among the married and among the widowed. In each 
society there are about five times more widows than widowers over age 65 (sex ratios 
among the widowed vary from 4.6 in Turkey to 5.6 in Japan).  The sex ratios among the 
married vary from 3 married men over 65 for every two married women in Singapore (sex 
ratio=0.63) and Turkey, to 5 married men to every 4 married women in Canada (sex 
ratio=0.8). These sex ratios in widowhood and being married in later life are remarkably 
similar across these five contrasting countries. 
 
At advanced ages (over 80), the sex ratios of being married become sharper, whereby about 
twice as many married people are men than women in each of these countries (Table 2b). 
There is somewhat more variation in the sex ratio among the widowed across these societies, 
varying from 3.6 more widows than widowers in Turkey to 6.15 more widows than 
widowers in Japan, reflecting cultural differences between these societies. The importance 
of the sex ratio among the widowed above age 80 is brought into sharp relief, given that 
about 60% of people over 80 across all five societies are widowed (Table 2a). Since most 
care and support is needed above age 80, not only are women the primary group in need of 
care, but they are predominantly widows. In contrast, men over age 80 who need care or 
support are primarily married, so can rely on their wife for support should they require it.  
 
Gender differences in late marriage and remarriage 
 
The gender difference in ‘being married’ and in ‘being widowed’ is influenced not only by 
gender differences in life expectancy and age at first marriage, but also gender differences in 
rates of remarriage (following widowhood and divorce). Thus, an additional factor 
compounding the disproportionate number of widows compared with widowers is that 
widowers are more likely than widows to remarry including at very old ages. These higher 
remarriage rates of men reflect cultural norms and gender inequalities of power and status.   
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As little international comparative data is available on rates of remarriage by age and 
gender, Table 3 provides data on marriages above age 65 for men and women. The first 
column indicates the sex ratio of getting married above age 65, showing that in Canada and 
the UK twice as many men aged over 65 get married as women. However, in many societies 
this gender inequality is much greater, reaching around five times more men marrying above 
65 than women in Greece and Turkey, and over eight times more men of this age marrying 
than women in Hong Kong.   
……………………… 
Table 3 about here 
……………………… 
 
The gender inequality in ‘being married’ and ‘being widowed’ across societies is enhanced 
in many societies where it is normative for the groom to be much older than the bride. Table 
3 (second and third columns) shows among men and women who marry above age 65, what 
proportion marry a spouse who is under age 50.  In each society, at least 5 times more older 
men marry a wife under 50, than older women marry a husband under 50.  This gender 
asymmetry in marriage ages is very stark in many countries. Older men are over 30 times 
more likely to marry a women under 50, than older women marry a man under 50, in Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong and Turkey.   In general, very small proportions (under 2%) of women 
over 65 marry a husband under age 50.  In Hong Kong, two-thirds of marriages of older men 
are to women under 50, and in Brazil and Turkey this is the case for over a third of 
marriages of older men. These large marriage age differentials reflect cultural traditions 
interlinked to broader gender inequalities and patriarchal ideologies in these societies. Thus, 
the greater the marriage age differential in societies, the greater the likelihood that men will 
be married even at very old ages, and the greater the likelihood that women will be widowed 
and live as a widow for more years of their life.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The span of later life from age 65 is increasing in all societies, and there is growing concern 
about to what extent intergenerational relationships can support the increasing needs for 
financial support and caregiving that will be required by the burgeoning older population.  
The chapter discussed four societal changes that are bringing these changes into sharper 
relief: the impact of transnational and rural-urban migration, the greater participation of 
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women in paid work, decreasing co-residence in multi-generational households, and the fall 
in fertility and increase in childlessness. These changes have impacts on intergenerational 
flows of financial and caring support between generations. Thus, societal, cultural and 
economic changes globally mean that the nature of intergenerational relations is changing 
with consequences for elders, particularly older women. These societal trends 
simultaneously reduce availability of carers for frail elders, while increasing grandparents’ 
role in childcare. They are likely to influence the availability of family caregivers for frail or 
disabled elders, with the greatest care gap likely to be experienced by older widows, who are 
particularly vulnerable in most societies in later life, and comprise the largest segment of 
frail older people in need of care in later life.  
 
Policy-makers often treat the ageing population as if it is homogenous. This chapter focused 
on two sources of diversity among the older population, namely gender and marital status. 
(Although this focus does not deny other important sources of difference and disadvantage 
in later life.)  Across nearly all societies, more women than men survive to advanced ages, 
and through frailty, mental confusion or disabled, often require care or support to remain 
living in the community.  
 
Older married people in the UK, irrespective of gender, are highly advantaged in terms of 
their material resources, living circumstances, and access to caring support (Arber and Ginn, 
1991, 1995).  However, this gender similarity among the married must be tempered by the 
recognition that over three-quarters of older men are married, and most are married when 
they die. In contrast the advantages associated with marriage are the province of only a 
minority of older women. Research in western societies shows that widows are much more 
likely to live in poverty than married older people and than widowers (Ginn, 2003; de Santis 
et al., 2008).  Widows, constitute over half of all older women across most societies. More 
research is needed on the well-being and access to caring support for both widows and 
widowers in developing societies, especially where there is a lack of state health and welfare 
support for older adults. 
 
Extensive research in the UK suggests that married older people who become disabled will 
be cared for by their spouse irrespective of gender (Arber and Ginn, 1991, 1992; Rose and 
Bruce 1995). Across the societies considered in this paper, since there are many more 
married older men than married older women, men are much more likely to receive care 
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from their spouse.  However, the small proportion of older married women may receive little 
caregiving support from their husbands in many societies.  In Asia and other emerging 
societies, if older married women are frail and disabled, cultural norms may mean they 
cannot rely on receiving care from their husband, but may have to depend on daughters or 
daughters-in-law or other caregivers who, due to declines in co-residence, are increasingly 
likely to live elsewhere.   
 
Marital status has a critical impact on older people’s need for care and support from relatives 
or others outside their household, and from state and private services. Global societal 
changes mean that older women are more likely in the future to live alone. Older women are 
likely to experience the disadvantages associated with living as a widow, which may be 
particularly poignant in societies with little welfare state provision and where there is 
welfare state retrenchment.    
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Table 1. Expectation of Life at Birth and age 65 by Gender and Country 
 
   Expectation of Life at Birth           Expectation of Life at 65 
 Male Female M/F Dif Male Female M/F Dif 
‘High’ Diff 
Canada - 2004 
US  - 2004 
Japan - 2006 
France - 2005 
Finland – 2006 
UK – 2000 
Brazil - 2005 
‘Excess’ Diff 
Russia - 2006 
Belarus - 2006 
Estonia – 2005 
Modest difference 
China – 2000 
Singapore - 2005 
Cuba – 2001-3 
Zimbabwe – 2001-2 
Abnormal low diff 
India - 2005 
Pakistan - 2003 
Eqypt – 2001 
Algeria – 2000 
 
77.8  
75.2 
 79.0 
76.8 
75.8 
75.3 
68.1 
 
60.4 
63.6 
67.2 
 
69.6 
77.9 
75.1 
42.7 
 
62.3 
64.7 
65.6 
72.5 
 
82.6 
80.4 
85.8 
83.8 
82.8 
80.1 
75.8 
 
73.2 
75.5 
78.1 
 
73.3 
81.6 
79.0 
45.9 
  
63.9 
65.6 
67.4 
74.2 
 
+5.8 
+5.2 
+6.8 
+7.0 
+7.0 
+4.8 
+7.7 
 
+12.8 
+11.9 
+10.9 
 
+3.7 
+3.7 
+3.9 
+3.2 
 
+1.6 
+0.9 
+1.8 
+1.7 
 
17.7 
17.1 
18.5 
17.7 
16.8 
15.7 
16.0 
 
11.4 
11.4 
13.1 
 
- 
20.9 
17.7 
12.5 
 
13.5 
15.4 
12.1 
16.1 
 
21.0 
20.0 
23.4 
22.0 
20.9 
18.8 
18.6 
 
15.6 
16.2 
18.0 
 
- 
23.6 
21.0 
14.5 
 
15.3 
15.4 
11.7 
16.6 
 
+3.3 
+2.9 
+4.9 
+4.3 
+4.1 
+3.1 
+2.6 
 
+4.2 
+4.8 
+4.9 
 
- 
+2.7 
+3.3 
+2.0 
 
+1.8 
0 
-0.4 
+0.5 
 
Source:  United Nations (2008) Demographic Yearbook, 2006, New York: United 
Nations. Derived from Table 22.  
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Table 2.  (a) Marital status distributions and (b) Sex Ratios of married or widowed, aged 65+ 
and 80+, in Canada, France, Japan, Singapore and Turkey 
    
 Canada 
2001 
France 
1999 
Japan 
2000 
Singapore 
2000 
Turkey 
2000 
(a) % Distribution 
Age 65+ 
Married 
Widowed 
Divorced + Never 
Married 
Total  
N= 
 
Age 80+ 
Married 
Widowed 
Divorced + Never 
Married 
Total  
N= 
 
(b) Sex Ratios 
Age 65+ 
Sex Ratio (F/M) 
Married ratio (F/M) 
Widowed ratio (F/M) 
Age 80+ 
Sex Ratio (F/M) 
Married ratio (F/M) 
Widowed ratio (F/M) 
 
 
56.4 
30.7 
12.9 
100% 
3888560 
 
 
34.8 
56.1 
9.1 
100% 
932050 
 
 
 
1.34 
0.76 
4.82 
 
1.93 
0.54 
4.93 
 
 
55.8 
32.1 
12.1 
100% 
9749280 
 
 
30.5 
58.8 
10.7 
100% 
2333882 
 
 
 
1.46 
0.80 
5.50 
 
2.17 
0.54 
5.53 
 
 
62.3 
32.1 
5.4 
100% 
21645928 
 
 
33.1 
62.8 
4.1 
100% 
4760001 
 
 
 
1.39 
0.76 
5.59 
 
2.05 
0.45 
6.15 
 
 
58.1 
36.8 
5.1 
100% 
231325 
 
 
35.5 
61.6 
2.9 
100% 
40134 
 
 
 
1.22 
0.63 
5.06 
 
1.69 
0.45 
4.32 
 
 
65.1 
34.1 
0.8 
100% 
3796430 
 
 
38.8 
58.9 
2.4 
100% 
462844 
 
 
 
1.25 
0.67 
4.61 
 
1.54 
0.51 
3.60  
 
Source:  United Nations (2009) Demographic Yearbook, 2007, New York: United 
Nations. Derived from Table 2.  
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 Table 3.  Marriages of men and women above age 65 by Country 
 
       
 Marriages age 
65+  
Male/Female 
Ratio 
% of Men        aged 
65+,  who marry a 
wife under age 50  
% of Women   aged 
65+, who marry a 
husband under age 
50 
 
Canada - 2002 
UK - 2002 
France - 2006 
Germany  - 2006 
Italy  - 2005 
Greece - 2006 
Turkey - 2006 
 
Brazil – 2006 
Japan - 2006 
Korea  - 2006 
Hong Kong – 2005 
 
1.91 
2.05 
2.17 
2.37 
4.32 
5.05 
5.33 
 
3.79 
2.42 
3.18 
8.44 
 
9.6%      (3246) 
14.4%     (4955) 
15.8%     (4737) 
16.5%    (7367) 
32.6%     (3065) 
28.3%       (757) 
40.4%     (4675) 
 
36.6%   (17699)      
18.6%     (4147) 
16.1%    (1901) 
67.3%    (1486) 
 
1.3%      (1719) 
1.9%      (2414) 
3.3%     (2187) 
2.2%     (3109) 
5.9%      (709) 
2.0%      (150) 
0.9%      (877) 
 
7.0%     (4666) 
0.5%     (1714) 
0.2%      (597) 
2.8%      (176) 
 
 
Source:  United Nations (2009) Demographic Yearbook, 2007, New York: United 
Nations. Derived from Table 24. 
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Figure 1.   Nature of Intergenerational Transfers between Generations 
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Figure 2  Sex Ratios (Female/Male) in 5 year age groups above age 60 across countries. 
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Figure 3.  Marital status distributions by gender, aged 65+ and 80+ in 4 societies.  
(a)   Canada (2001) 
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